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Abstract
Does population diversity matter for economic development in the long run? Is there 
a diﬀerent impact of diversity across time? This paper traces the short-, medium- and 
long-term economic impact of population diversity resulting from the big migration 
waves of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the United States (US). 
Using census data from 1880, 1900 and 1910, the settlement pattern of migrants 
across the counties of the 48 US continental states is tracked in order to construct 
measures of population fractionalization and polarization at county level. Factors 
which may have inﬂuenced both the individual settlement decision at the time of 
migration and county-level economic development in recent years are controlled for. 
The results of the analysis show that high levels of population fractionalization have 
a strong and positive inﬂuence on economic development in the short, medium and 
long run. High levels of polarization, by contrast, undermine development. Despite 
a stronger eﬀect on income levels in the ﬁrst 30 years, we ﬁnd these relationships to 
be extremely long lasting: counties with a more heterogeneous population composi-
tion over 130  years ago are signiﬁcantly richer today, whereas counties that were 
strongly polarized at the time of the migration waves have endured persistent nega-
tive economic eﬀects.
Keywords Diversity · Fractionalization · Polarization · Economic development · 
Counties · USA
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1 Introduction
In 2015, migration stock numbers worldwide exceeded expectations and rose to 
244 million (UNDESA 2016). Growing cross-border population ﬂows have con-
tributed to a shift both in the political discourse and in the scientiﬁc research 
agenda, bringing the analysis of the economic implications of migration into the 
fore.
Over the past decades, a vast amount of new scientiﬁc research has led to consid-
erable progress in our understanding of the economic implications of migration. The 
economic impact of migrants on both their own futures and that of locals (i.e. Bor-
jas 1994; Card 2005), on the local labour market and its dynamics (i.e. Altonji and 
Card 1991; Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Bijak et al. 2007), and on public ﬁnances (i.e. 
Kerr and Kerr 2011) has been extensively analysed. Transmission channels—such 
as increasing returns to scale (i.e. Borjas 1995), alterations to the ratio of skilled to 
unskilled labour (Lundborg and Segerström 2002), wages (Ottaviano and Peri 2006), 
or the stimulation of productivity by means of innovation and specialization (i.e. 
Gordon and McCann 2005; Partridge and Furtan 2008)—have also been an object 
of greater scrutiny. The focus of these studies, however, has generally been short 
term. Our understanding of the economic implications of migration has commonly 
been limited to the ﬁrst 5 to 10  years after the initial migration wave took place. 
The medium- to long-term impact of migration on economic prosperity has been 
mostly neglected. Only in recent years have researchers started to address this gap. 
In particular, recent work by Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2014) has dem-
onstrated how current levels of economic development across the US still depend 
on migration settlement patterns that took place over 100 years ago. Sequeira et al. 
(2018) have conﬁrmed the signiﬁcance of this relationship. This long-term impact 
of migration holds in time regardless of the national origin of migrants settling in 
diﬀerent territories (Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch 2015).
However, one important demographic aspect related to migration has remained 
ﬁrmly anchored in short-term scrutiny: diversity. As formerly homogeneous com-
munities become more diverse by accommodating new individuals bringing their 
customs, traditions, ideas, abilities and experiences with them, the question of 
whether more diverse societies facilitate or deter growth has become more promi-
nent. Research on the economic impact of population diversity has ﬂourished, focus-
ing on a multitude of transmission channels ranging from skill variety, social inter-
action, innovative networks, institutions and the provision of public goods to trust, 
social participation, social unrest and conﬂict (i.e. Easterly and Levine 1997; Ales-
ina and La Ferrara 2005; Ottaviano and Peri 2006; Gören 2014; Alesina et al. 2016; 
Bove and Elia 2017; Kemeny and Cooke 2017). Most of this research has unveiled 
a considerable eﬀect of diversity on growth over the short term. Yet, our knowl-
edge about whether population diversity levels generated by past migration waves 
still aﬀect economic outcomes over the medium and long term remains untouched 
within the scientiﬁc literature. In this respect, by looking at the impact of population 
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diversity at county level more than one century ago on current levels of develop-
ment, this paper ﬁlls a gap in our knowledge that has not been covered before.1
We seek to ascertain whether territories that were characterized by a large degree 
of population diversity more than a century ago are wealthier today compared to 
those that remained more homogenous in their population composition. Does having 
a very diverse population at one point in time lead to persistently higher levels of 
economic growth? Or is the economic impact of diversity only evident in the short 
term, vanishing once the diﬀerent population groups become part of the society’s 
“melting pot”?
In this paper, we assess the extent to which the high degree of cultural diversity in 
US counties generated during the Era of Mass Migration of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century has left an enduring impact on the economic development of 
those areas of the US that witnessed the greatest heterogeneity in population. Incor-
porating a twofold deﬁnition of the notion of diversity, encompassing two distinct 
dimensions of the term (fractionalization and polarization), we undertake a decade-
by-decade analysis for the US at the subnational level covering the period between 
1880 and 2010. We posit that a vibrant, highly diverse population, stemming from 
a multitude of diﬀerent backgrounds, nationalities and cultures has the capacity to 
leave a long-lasting economic impact. We argue that population diversity becomes 
embedded not only in local institutions but in the very core of a territory, aﬀecting 
the subsequent economic development path of the region not only over the short 
term, but also over the medium and long term.
In order to test whether this is the case, the paper adopts the following structure: 
Section 2 gives an overview of the historical background of the Age of Mass Migra-
tion. Section 3 summarizes previous approaches to the link between diversity and 
economic development in the literature. In Sect. 4, we describe the model, methodo-
logical aspects and the data adopted for our research. We also explain the calcula-
tions of the various indices used in the paper as main variables of interest. Section 5 
reports the results of our estimation, while Sect. 6 concludes.
2  Mass Migration to and Within America: A Short Overview
When speaking of the Age of Mass Migration to the US, historians refer to the 
period between the pre-Civil War years and the mid-1920s. Within this time span, 
more than 40 million Europeans left their homelands aﬀected to diﬀerent degrees by 
political disturbances, famine and religious persecution in search of a new and bet-
ter life. The large majority of these migrants chose the US as their ﬁnal destination 
(Hatton and Williamson 1994; Bertocchi and Strozzi 2006). With an average annual 
immigration inﬂow rate of about 0.75% of the total US population at the time (Hat-
ton and Williamson 1998), the US experienced a population increase in an extent 
1 A thorough discussion of the unique contribution of the manuscript to the existing literature is pre-
sented in Section 1 of Supplementary Online Material.
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which had been unheard of in contemporary history.2 During this period, the  total 
US population increased sixfold, from about 17 to 105 million. Meanwhile, the pro-
portion of the foreign-born white population grew from 13% in 1850 to approxi-
mately 18% in 1910 (Table 1). Most importantly, “the proportion of people of for-
eign birth and parentage together reached its maximum level of 45% in 1920” (Ward 
1990: 299).
At that time, no restricting legislation prevented incoming migrants from enter-
ing the country. Migrants—no matter which nationality—could roam freely and set-
tle wherever they wished.3 The introduction of the literacy test in the Immigration 
Act of 1917 led to the ﬁrst serious restriction to immigration. Quotas for incoming 
migrants followed in 1921 (Emergency Quota Act of 1921). By 1924, entry restric-
tions for all foreigners were passed (Goldin 1994; Alexander 2007).
Most newcomers settled where relatives and friends had already settled (e.g. 
Vedder and Gallaway 1972; Levy and Wadycki 1973; Dentlevy and Gemery 1977) 
creating distinct migrant communities across the country. Hence, regions with 
large migrant networks attracted further newcomers, while others remained nearly 
untouched by this mass movement of population. The resulting settlement pattern is 
depicted in Fig. 1 for 1910.4
The North and West of the country attracted most migrants. Southern states 
remained, by contrast, largely inhabited by American-born residents. Migrants 
established themselves in the rural areas of Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota and 
Wisconsin (Fig. 1) and further to the west in sparsely populated counties, as well 
as in southern Texas and the southern tip of Florida in the South. Cities, especially 
in New England and the Atlantic states, as well as Chicago became big magnets 
Table 1  US population 
composition, 1840–1920 (in 
percentages of total population)
Source: Ward (1990)
n.d. no data
Year Population 
(millions)
Black (%) Foreign par-
entage (%)
Foreign born (%)
1840 17.1 16.8 n.d. n.d.
1850 23.2 15.7 n.d. 12.9
1860 31.4 14.1 n.d. 17.9
1870 39.8 13.5 19.0 19.6
1880 50.2 13.1 22.5 17.8
1890 62.9 11.9 25.0 19.9
1900 76.0 11.6 27.6 18.1
1910 92.0 10.7 27.8 18.0
1920 105.7 9.9 28.0 16.9
3 With the notable exception of the Chinese after the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Frazier and Margai 
2010).
4 The situation in 1880 and 1900 was roughly similar. Maps are available upon request.
2 In peak years, the annual inﬂow rate of immigrants reached heights of around 1.5% of the total popula-
tion at the time (Kim 2007).
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for migrants, especially for those entering the country during the second migration 
wave between 1890 and 1920.
While international migration rose rapidly, changing the population composition 
of large parts of the United States, internal migration also picked up speed, reach-
ing exceptionally high geographical population mobility levels. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, almost 60% of the male US population above the age of 30 had 
moved across county or state lines and almost a third of those born in the US lived 
outside their place of birth (Haines 2000; Ferrie 2005). Similar to international 
migrants, American-born population moved especially westward in search of land to 
expand the wheat, corn, wool and meat production (Atack et al. 2000).
Most internal migrants of the late nineteenth century, however, travelled only 
over short distances, with the majority remaining within their state of birth. Twenty 
percent, however, covered much larger distances, in some cases up to 4500 km (own 
calculations). Figure 2 depicts their settlement pattern in 1910. The resulting map 
reveals a diﬀerent geography of American-born internal migration than that of inter-
national migration. Internal migrants mainly moved from East to West, settling in 
many states west of the Mississippi (with the exception of Utah, New Mexico, Texas 
and parts of California). The majority of the population of midwestern states such as 
Oklahoma, Wyoming, Montana, Oregon, Nevada and Arizona was thus made up of 
internal migrants. The entire eastern and southern parts of the country (including the 
growing migrant agglomerations in the eastern cities) remained, with the exception 
of Florida, outside of internal migration routes.
Fig. 1  International migrants and their children as share of population by county in 1910. Source: Rod-
ríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2014)
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Both international and internal migration movements aﬀected the population 
composition of the US drastically. In parts of the north-western states, for example, 
within a few years the population changed from being almost entirely local-born to 
rates of 90% or more born in other US states or abroad. Internal migrants originat-
ing from locations often thousands of kilometres away were as foreign to the local 
population as the Germans, Irish, Italians or Poles settling within the same county. 
Whilst their language was the same—as was the case for migrants from the British 
Isles—internal migrants brought habits, customs, traditions and a life style which 
was regarded as outlandish and strange by the local population (Merk 1978).
Whereas some areas of the US were predominantly settled by one or two spe-
ciﬁc nationalities (Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch 2015), other regions attracted 
a multitude of migrants stemming from all over the United States as well as from a 
variety of diﬀerent countries, leading to high levels of population diversity. Figure 3 
displays the levels of population diversity—proxied by the widely used index of 
fractionalization, which emphasizes the number of diﬀerent groups within a popula-
tion—across US counties in both 1880 and 1910.5 High levels of population diver-
sity became the norm primarily in the West of the country (with the exception of 
parts of New Mexico, Texas and Utah), while huge swaths of the old South remained 
demographically homogeneous. Cities in the North East, such as New York City and 
Boston, hosted vibrant, mixed migrant communities. By contrast, other areas in the 
North East, such as Maine, Vermont, or parts of upstate New York, were character-
ized by low population diversity levels generally ranging between 0 and 0.3.
Fig. 2  American-born internal migrants as share of population by county in 1910. Source: Own elabora-
tion, using Ruggles et al. (2015) data
5 The calculation of the fractionalization index will be explained in detail in Sect. 4.
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Fig. 3  Diversity in the composition of the population by county in 1880 and 1910. Source: Own elabora-
tion, using Ruggles et al. (2015) data
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3  Diversity and Economic Development
With both international and internal migrants arriving and moving around, pop-
ulation diversity across the US changed drastically (Collier 2013). How such a 
rapid shock to diversity levels has aﬀected ensuing economic development is 
therefore a highly relevant question. Whether population diversity leads to higher 
or lower growth has turned into a widely discussed and often controversial topic 
in the theoretical and empirical literature across a wide range of disciplines, rang-
ing from sociology and anthropology to political science, demography, geogra-
phy, and economics. Overall, conclusions are far from clear-cut due to a mix of 
alternative indices, changing geographical units and varying aggregation levels.
Two opposing strands dominate the debate—one depicting diversity as growth-
enhancing, the other as growth-reducing. As the deﬁnition of diversity is far from 
straightforward, the strongly diﬀering views result primarily from the respective 
dimension of diversity examined. Both strands choose entirely diﬀerent angles 
to evaluate the link between diversity and economic development. Consequently, 
a variety of indices as proxy of diversity is used, with each indicator measuring 
a diﬀerent aspect of the notion. The most popular proxies used are measures of 
population fractionalization, on the one hand, and polarization and segregation, 
on the other. Hence, whether diversity fosters or deters growth strongly hinges on 
the indicator employed.
The strand of research considering diversity as growth-enhancing generally 
regards it as a central driver of innovation and creativity, which in turn fosters 
technological progress and growth. Migrants arriving from diverse locations are 
depicted as an important input in the process of technological progress. They 
bring diﬀerent skills, ideas, experiences and abilities to their places of destina-
tion. However, the speed of technological progress fuelled by the inflowing popu-
lation does not depend on the size of the influx but on their composition, trans-
forming diversity into a productivity-enhancing and innovation-initiating factor 
(Bove and Elia 2017).
The connection between diversity and innovation dates back at least to Jacobs 
(1961, 1969). For her, environments which are characterized by the presence of a 
large variety of cultural groups provide a more fertile soil for new ideas. Within 
these idea-breeding grounds, new innovative concepts can spread more easily to 
different areas than in more homogenous places, thereby fostering innovation and 
growth. Florida’s creative class model (2002) supports this line of argumenta-
tion. As skilled, liberal people prefer to live in diverse regions, skilled jobs and 
innovation will cluster in these same areas. The “New Argonauts” theory devel-
oped by Saxenian (2006) is yet another example of diversity leading to innova-
tion. The concept revolves around foreign-born, technically high-skilled entre-
preneurs, travelling back and forth between their home countries and the Silicon 
Valley, boosting economic activity both in the once-peripheral regions of their 
home countries, and in the United States. Lazear (1999) draws a parallel to a firm 
context analysing the globalization of firms. He finds that skill complementarity 
in a team spanning multiple cultures is key to not only offset the potential costs of 
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diversity, but to signiﬁcantly raise overall ﬁrm productivity. The interaction of a 
multitude of people with diﬀerent abilities, ideas and experiences triggers innova-
tion, technological process, and hence growth.
Empirical research has tended to validate this view. Niebuhr (2010) shows that 
patent applications increase in proportion to labour force diversity across German 
regions. Özgen et al. (2011a) ﬁnd that innovation levels rise with the degree of 
diversity in the migrant community across European countries. A diverse labour 
force and immigrants originating from a wide range of countries “not only con-
tribute to innovation by means of their high skills and innate abilities, but […] 
they also bring into ﬁrms and host countries new ideas and perspectives from their 
diﬀerent cultural backgrounds” (Özgen et al. 2011b: 1). An enlarged national-ori-
gin pool is also linked to improvements in problem-solving, new combinations of 
ideas and innovation (i.e. Hong and Page 2001, 2004), while interethnic ties con-
tribute to increase the socio-economic status of migrants (Riedel 2015). Alesina 
et al. (2016) report that the productive eﬀects of increasing population diversity 
are largest for high-skilled migrants and for migrants stemming from wealthier 
and more culturally similar source countries.
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) unveil a signiﬁcant positive and robust correlation 
of both wages and rents with regional immigrant diversity in US metropolitan 
areas, emphasizing that a more multicultural environment increases the produc-
tivity level of US-born citizens. From a slightly diﬀerent angle, other studies por-
tray diversity as productivity-enhancing not only in regions or cities but also in 
work establishments. The enlarged skill set of the workforce as well as the inter-
action of these diverse work teams with each other facilitates the production of 
a larger variety of goods and services, raising labour productivity levels, even 
when holding average ability constant (i.e. Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Hamil-
ton et al. 2003; Trax et al. 2015; Kemeny and Cooke 2017).
Two common denominators link the above diversity-promoting studies. Firstly, 
the large majority places the emphasis on the subnational, more granular level, 
evaluating either the impact of diversity at a regional, city, or even individual 
level. Secondly, and more importantly, this strand of research generally considers 
diversity on the basis of the number of diﬀerent population groups—varying by 
language, religion or ethnicity—within a territory. They tend to use an index of 
fractionalization—such as Alesina et al.’s (2003)—as the measure of population 
diversity. This type of index presupposes that the greater the number of groups, 
the higher the assumed diversity in a society, positively inﬂuencing the potential 
for growth. The groups’ size or the distance between them does not enter the cal-
culation of the most frequently used indices.
The strand of research positing that diversity has a negative inﬂuence on eco-
nomic development follows a diﬀerent line of thought. Rather than focusing on 
the positive inﬂuence of diversity on idea generation, innovation and productiv-
ity, it considers the presence of diverse groups as destabilizing factor within a 
society enhancing the potential for social unrest and conﬂict. This group not only 
takes into account fractionalization as proxy for diversity but increasingly refers 
to the use of indices of segregation and polarization.
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“When the society is divided by religious, ethnolinguistic or race diﬀerences, 
tensions emerge along these divisions” (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005a: 308). 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization has thus been inversely linked to per capita GDP 
and long-run growth in large cross-country samples (e.g. Easterly and Levine 1997; 
Alesina et al. 2003; Churchill and Smyth 2017). Alesina et al. (2003), for example, 
ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between a wholly homogenous and a wholly heterogeneous 
society represented up to 1.9 percentage points in economic growth in favour of the 
former. The poor economic performance of African countries has been, in particu-
lar, blamed on ethnic conﬂict, resulting from high levels of national or ethnic polari-
zation (Easterly and Levine 1997).
Various channels have been identiﬁed as vehicles through which diversity hin-
ders economic development. Gören (2014) emphasizes the negative direct eﬀect of 
diversity for economic growth and considers polarization an indirect source of nega-
tive economic eﬀects via human capital, investment, openness and civil war. East-
erly and Levine (1997) point to a reduced probability of adopting “good policies” in 
more polarized societies. According to their study, low school attainment, ﬁnancial 
debt and low infrastructure quality are all consequences of high segregation levels. 
Moreover, diversity is believed to foster rent-seeking behaviour by diﬀerent groups, 
further undermining the potential for adopting sound public policies. Overall, high 
polarization triggers “positive incentives for growth-reducing policies, such as 
ﬁnancial repression and overvalued exchange rates, that create rents for the groups 
in power at the expense of society at large” (Easterly and Levine 1997: 1206).
More fragmented societies are found to curb public sector performance and to 
generate poor institutions (La Porta et al. 1999; Mauro 1995; Easterly et al. 2006), 
leading to regional disparities (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose 2013, 2017), an inef-
ﬁcient provision of public goods and services, a reduction in government transfers 
and distortionary taxation (Desmet et al. 2009; Azzimonti 2011), political instability 
(Alesina et al. 1999, 2003; Baldwin and Huber 2010), as well as increasing property 
rights insecurity (Keefer and Knack 2002) and low quality of government (Alesina 
and Zhuravskaya 2011). Enhanced heterogeneity may even result in the formation of 
xenophobic political parties (ibid), undermine collective action and reduce the eﬃ-
ciency of regulation (Baland and Platteau 2003; Platteau and Seki 2007).
Diversity is further shown to impact political rights, adversely aﬀecting economic 
growth (Collier 2001). Particularly in less democratic societies, polarization can 
curtail individual rights and limit overall economic performance (Bluedorn 2001; 
Alesina et al. 2003). Further consequences of highly diverse and polarized societies 
are a reduction in trust and social participation, ineﬃcient communication, less eco-
nomic integration, lower voting turnout and a rise in transaction costs for bridging 
cultural diﬀerences (i.e. Ancona and Caldwell 1992; Alesina et  al. 1999; Alesina 
and La Ferrara 2000; Richard et  al. 2002; Van Knippenberg and Schippers 2007; 
Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2011; Uslaner 2011; Mavridis 2015; Martinez i Coma and 
Nai 2017). The resulting rent-seeking behaviour leads to slower growth, lower pro-
duction, reduced investment and diminished prosperity (Rodrik 1999; Alesina and 
La Ferrara 2005, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005b). “In extreme cases, diversity 
can prompt large-scale social and economic collapse, sometimes with horriﬁc con-
sequences, as has occurred in recent years in parts of Central Africa, the Balkans, 
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and elsewhere” (Kemeny 2012). Highly fragmented societies have been deemed 
prone to moderate-intensity conﬂict. In highly polarized societies, conﬂict can be 
less frequent but of higher intensity (Esteban and Ray 2008). The likelihood and 
frequency of civil wars—an extreme example of social collapse—have been asso-
ciated with high population diversity in terms of polarization (i.e. Horowitz 1985; 
Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005a, b).
Focusing on regional data, these results have been upheld by a number of studies 
analysing the case of the US. High diversity in US communities has been connected 
to a less eﬃcient provision of public goods, lower trust and less social participation 
(i.e. Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Luttmer 2001; Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2002). Diversity has also been considered a strong and persisting barrier to 
developing trust across racial, ethnic or national origins (Glaeser et al. 2000).
Again, a string of common denominators links the above studies. Firstly, within 
this strand of the literature and with few exceptions, studies tend to use nations as 
the unit of analysis. Secondly, diversity is increasingly referred to as triggering 
the negative eﬀects of polarization and segregation. Diﬀerent indices have been 
employed by the literature in order to capture this eﬀect. One of the most commonly 
used, proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994), ﬁnds its roots in the social tension litera-
ture. Here, indices measure entirely diﬀerent aspects of diversity than fractionaliza-
tion. Rather than focusing on the number of groups within a population, polariza-
tion indices emphasize their relative size to one another and the distance separating 
them. The bigger the distance among groups, the more similar their size, and the 
stronger the lines separating them the smaller the capacity to communicate and 
hence the larger the negative impact of diversity on economic development. Accord-
ing to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a), social unrest is further aggravated if 
the population is distributed into two separate groups of similar size.
In short, cultural diversity aﬀects trust among the inhabitants of primarily mul-
tinational, multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries. It upsets the coordination of 
actors and their communication, generating animosity, enlarging diﬀerences in pref-
erences and creating situations of conﬂict. Simultaneously, however, this multitude 
of experiences, skills and abilities can foster technological innovation, create a fer-
tile soil for new ideas, increase productivity levels and therefore enhance the supply 
and the quality of goods and services. By inﬂuencing both human capital and the 
process of technological progress, diversity has an undeniable impact on economic 
growth with its net eﬀect, however, remaining still unclear (Bove and Elia 2017).
One aspect which has been largely neglected in all of the aforementioned lit-
erature still needs to be evaluated: the dynamic economic impact of diversity over 
time. While there is big controversy about how fractionalization and/or polarization 
matter for economic growth, to the best of our knowledge, we know only very lit-
tle about whether higher or lower initial levels of diversity—regardless of measure-
ment—aﬀect growth diﬀerently in the short, medium or very long term.
Research that dwells on the time dimension of diversity is few and far between. 
Campos and Kuzeyev (2007) or Campos et al. (2011) treat changing levels of polari-
zation over time and examine their short-term impact on growth. Both ﬁnd a neg-
ative eﬀect of polarization. Alesina et  al. (2016) and Ager and Brückner (2013a) 
consider time frames of 10 and 50 years, respectively, evaluating a sample of 120 
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countries with panel data between 1990 and 2000 (the former) or following a within-
county estimation approach for US counties that measures the impact of the change 
in the cultural composition across a 50-year (1870–1920) period on economic 
growth (the latter). Both ﬁnd fractionalization to be positively related to economic 
prosperity, while polarization has the opposite eﬀect. However, neither assesses the 
impact of a ﬁxed initial level of diversity on economic performance across alternat-
ing time horizons. Furthermore, while Ager and Brückner (2013a) base their study 
on the same historical time frame as used in this paper, they do not extend their 
analysis to present levels of economic development.
The studies that come closest to analyse a dynamic eﬀect of diversity over longer 
time horizons are rare. They include Ager and Brückner (2013b) and Bove and Elia 
(2017). The former report a signiﬁcant short- and long-term impact of initial diver-
sity levels on economic development in the US. However, they refer to the use of 
genetic diversity based on Ashraf and Galor (2013), rather than including the two 
most frequently discussed proxies of diversity: fractionalization and polarization. 
Bove and Elia (2017) identify a positive association of both fractionalization and 
polarization with real GDP per capita, when evaluating a 135-country sample over 
a 50-year time frame. The positive link of both indicators—consecutively added to 
their model—is signiﬁcant over the long term, but fails to retrieve consistent results 
over the short, 10- to 20-year time frame.
In short, to the best of our knowledge, there is no scientiﬁc research treating both 
dimensions of diversity—fractionalization and polarization—connecting historical 
population diversity levels to current economic development and covering a period 
longer than 50  years. Thus, some key questions remain unanswered: does diver-
sity, in its two fundamental dimensions of fractionalization and polarization, shape 
growth—if at all—diﬀerently in the short term than in the medium and long term? 
Does a high degree of fractionalization and/or polarization generated more than a 
century ago promote growth in the short run, but limit it in the long term? Or is it 
vice versa?
4  Empirical Approach
The aim of this paper is precisely to ﬁll this important gap in the literature by exam-
ining the extent to which the levels of initial diversity, deﬁned by both fraction-
alization and polarization, generated during the Age of Mass Migration across US 
counties: (a) have left a long-lasting economic legacy that can still be identiﬁed in 
the economic development of US counties today and (b) whether any positive or 
negative inﬂuence of initial diversity on economic development has waxed or waned 
with time.
Based on the previous discussion, we adopt two econometric models in order to 
test our two research questions: one focusing on population heterogeneity, the other 
on population homogeneity. Following the relevant literature, we employ place-of-
origin fractionalization and polarization—the two most commonly used indices—to 
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depict population diversity in Model 1. Its almost polar opposite, place-of-origin 
concentration, is used to reﬂect population homogeneity in Model 2.
We expect both dimensions of diversity—fractionalization and polarization—to 
matter for economic development over very long time frames. We not only assume 
that the growth-inﬂuencing traits of diversity become embedded in the local mental-
ity, traditions and customs—in short, in local institutions—but also that big diversity 
shocks in a given period of time can become etched in the core characteristics of a 
territory and thus persist over very long time periods.
The implications of this assumption are twofold. First, US counties having 
received large inﬂows of both international and internal migrants stemming from a 
multitude of diﬀerent origins more than a century ago should be significantly more 
prosperous today than those which displayed a more homogeneous population com-
position at the time. Second, we expect US counties marked by a highly polarized 
population composition during the Age of Mass Migration to have faced consider-
able barriers to the development of economic activity, deeply limiting their growth 
potential. Consequently, we assume historical fractionalization to be positively 
connected to current income levels across US counties, while historical degrees of 
polarization are likely to be negatively and significantly associated with them.
Moreover, in line with Ager and Brückner (2013b), we hypothesize that time will 
not significantly alter the impact of diversity on economic development. We assume 
a highly fragmented (highly polarized) society to retain its positive (negative) impact 
consistently over the short, the medium and the long term. Despite the fact that inter-
national migrants become American and internal migrants adopt local traits over 
time, their cultural baggage brought from their place of origin remains with them and 
is passed not just to the following generations, but especially to their chosen place of 
residence. As diversity becomes embedded in the core character of the county, it per-
manently influences its subsequent economic development path for decades.
4.1  Model 1—Population Heterogeneity: The Case for Diversity
Model 1 is concerned with diversity measured as fractionalization and polarization. 
The model adopts the following form:
where y represents the income per capita of county i in period t (t = 2010, 2000, …, 
1900); Fract is the level of fractionalization in a given county i in t0, which cor-
responds to either 1880, 1900 or 1910; Pol is the degree of polarization in a given 
county i in t0; X is a vector of variables which are assumed to influence the level of 
development of any given county at time t − k (k = 10); Z represents a similar vec-
tor of factors which may have influenced the development of the county at time 
t0.
6 Lastly, state depicts state controls taking into account unobservable state-spe-
cific effects and ε represents the error term clustered at the state level s to ensure 
yi,t = 훼 + 훽Fracti,t0 + 휆Poli,t0 + 휕Xi,t−k + 휃Zi,t0 + 휇state + 휀is
6 In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, this vector is only included when analysing the long term. 
For the short-term regression analysis, this vector is excluded.
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robustness to arbitrary spatial correlation within one state. Our main coeﬃcients of 
interest are 훽 and 휆 describing the relationship of the two dimensions of diversity 
with economic development.
4.2  Model 2—Population Homogeneity: The Case for Concentration
In order to assess the robustness of our results, Model 2 resorts to an index of con-
centration to reﬂect population homogeneity as the main independent variable of 
interest. All other variables remain the same as in Model 1. In this alternative set-up, 
the model adopts the following form:
where Conc is deﬁned as the level of concentration within the population of any 
given county i in t0 corresponding to either 1880, 1900 or 1910 and ω represents 
the error term clustered at the state level s. All other input variables refer to those 
presented in Model 1.
4.3  Variables of Interest: Two Measures of Diversity and an Index 
of Concentration
4.3.1  Diversity
Following the two opposing strands of literature dealing with the link between diver-
sity and economic growth, we resort to the two most commonly employed diversity 
indices to proxy population heterogeneity: fractionalization and polarization.
Fractionalization (i.e. Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 2003) emphasizes 
the number of diﬀerent groups within a population. It goes back to the work by the 
Soviet researchers Bruk and Apenchenko (1964) who crafted an index of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization in the Atlas Narodov Mira (Atlas of the peoples of the 
world) based on the shares in total population of ethnolinguistic groups. The modi-
ﬁed version of this index by Alesina et al. (2003) is used in this paper as our ﬁrst 
indicator of diversity:
where Fract
i,t0
 is the degree of fractionalization in county i at time t
0
 where s depicts 
the share of total population of origin group g in county i at time t
0
 . This index 
“captures the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to diﬀerent 
groups” (Campos and Kuzeyev 2007: 622). Hence, Fract
i,t0
 increases with the num-
ber of groups, taking on values between 0 and 1, with 1 − 휎 reﬂecting a highly frac-
tionalized and 0 + 휎 a strongly homogeneous society, with 휎 → 0.7 If each person in 
a territory belongs to a diﬀerent group, the index reaches its theoretical maximum.
yi,t = 휒 + 훿Conci,t0 + 휙Xi,t−k + 휂Zi,t0 + 휗state + 휔is
Fracti,t0
= 1 −
n∑
g=1
s2
g,i,t0
7 휎 represents any small positive number so that Fract
i,t0
 becomes arbitrarily close to 1 or 0, respectively.
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Polarization aims to capture the social tension and conﬂict dimension linked 
to a heterogeneous population. Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999), from a theoretical, 
and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a), from an empirical standpoint, argue 
that a highly polarized environment maximizes the risk of conﬂict. The measure 
of polarization is based on the family of indices developed by Esteban and Ray 
(1994, 1999), considering not only the number of ethnic groups within a society, 
but also the distances separating them and their individual size. According to this 
index type, the degree of polarization within a population increases as the distance 
between groups rises, but also when the number of groups increase or when there is 
convergence in group size. As the calculation of distance between ethnic groups is 
highly controversial, we follow Reynal-Querol (2002) for our index, assuming the 
absolute distance between two groups to be equal and discrete.8 The polarization 
index in this case “measures the normalized distance of a particular distribution 
of ethnic […] groups from a bimodal distribution” (ibid, p. 301) and is maximized 
when two highly distinguishable groups of equal size coexist within the same 
population.
The polarization index takes on the following form:
where Pol
i,t0
 is the degree of polarization in county i at time t
0
 , and s depicts the 
share of total population of origin group g in county i at time t
0
 . Within this particu-
lar speciﬁcation, it is the size of the groups relative to each other that is of particular 
importance.
Both indices used in the analysis are aligned to the speciﬁcations of our dataset. 
Instead of ethnic groups as generally used in the literature, we consider the birth-
places of individuals—as deﬁned by the US Census—living in a given county at 
t
0
 as an indicator for diﬀerent cultural groups. Birthplaces include both European 
countries and American states in order to properly account for international as well 
as for the high degree of internal migration prevailing at the time. As the histori-
cal US Census did not record the county of birth, but solely the state, our indicator 
does not pick up the bulk of the short-distance, intra-state internal migration. Only 
population groups of internal migrants which travelled large distances leaving their 
home state are included into the calculation of the index. We therefore take into 
consideration only the fraction of internal migrants which were identiﬁed to be sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent to the local population (i.e. Merk 1978).9
Poli,t0
= 1 −
n∑
g=1
(
0.5 − sg,i,t0
0.5
)2
∗ sg,i,t0
8 One of the few papers estimating the distance between ethnic groups is Fearon (2003). Language is 
used as a proxy of cultural distance.
9 The reasons for the inclusion in the diversity index of both long-distance internal and external migrants 
are developed in greater detail in Section 2 of Supplementary Online Material.
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Figure 4 plots the relationship between polarization and fractionalization in US 
counties for all three base years: 1880, 1900 and 1910. It is important to note that 
varying the size of both indices does not reveal a consistent interdependency. Con-
ditional on the degree of polarization, the extent of the correlation with fractionali-
zation varies. Both indices are highly positively correlated at low levels of societal 
diversity, indicating that adding a further cultural group to an otherwise perfectly 
homogenous population increases the risk of polarization and conﬂict. However, as 
cultural heterogeneity increases, the positive relationship wanes and becomes irrel-
evant at medium levels of both polarization and fractionalization. The more a popu-
lation becomes fragmented, the lower the societal standing and inﬂuence of a sin-
gle population group, which reduces the societal polarization within a given county. 
At higher levels of fractionalization, the relationship between both indices turns 
strongly negative. Once above a certain fractionalization threshold, the addition of 
further cultural groups to a population signiﬁcantly decreases the risk of polariza-
tion. This relationship is consistent across all three base years and in line with previ-
ous ﬁndings by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a, b), Ager and Brückner (2013a) 
or Bove and Elia (2017), underlining the validity of the data.
Fig. 4  Fractionalization versus polarization for all three base years. Source: Own elaboration, using Rug-
gles et al. (2015) data
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It is important to stress once again that both indices measure entirely different 
dimensions of diversity. While one focuses on the number of cultural groups leading 
to innovation, the other stresses their relative size, and thus the potential for provok-
ing social unrest and conﬂict. Based on these highly distinct theoretical concepts, 
both indices thus identify independent and distinguishable eﬀects of diversity on 
economic growth. From a theoretical standpoint, their joint inclusion in our empiri-
cal model minimizes the risk of omitted variable bias and allows us to capture a 
more accurate and encompassing eﬀect of the multidimensional notion of diver-
sity on economic growth. Concerns about the joint inclusion of both variables are 
addressed from an empirical standpoint in Fig. 4, which rules out the risk of biased 
results due to correlation issues. Following Ager and Brückner (2013a), Alesina 
et al. (2003), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) and Gören (2014), we include 
both indices of fractionalization and polarization in our model, as both indices cap-
ture a different aspect of diversity.10
4.3.2  Concentration
The opposite of diversity is concentration, understood as the marked dominance of 
one group (based on place of origin) in a given territory. We employ this alternative 
variable of interest to assess the robustness of the results when analysing the diver-
sity indices. The concentration index is deﬁned as follows:
where Conc
i,t0
 is the degree of concentration within the population of county i at 
time t
0
 , and s depicts the share of total population of origin group g in county i at 
time t
0
 . According to this deﬁnition, the index always takes on the population share 
of the largest represented birthplace group within the population of the particular 
county i , thereby indicating the degree of concentration within a territory.
4.4  Controls: Factors In!uencing County Development at Two Di#erent Points 
in Time
We introduce two sets of control variables into our model. The ﬁrst group of control 
variables is vector Z dating from the time of the big migration waves—1880, 1900 
and 1910—and consists of factors which inﬂuenced a county’s attraction to immi-
grants at the time. The controls comprise mean income (as natural log), total popula-
tion (as natural log), literacy rate, unemployment rate, female participation rate in 
the labour force, share of black population and the percentage of workers employed 
in agriculture. As these parameters are bound to have inﬂuenced the settlement deci-
sion of the individual migrants (see Jennissen 2003), we can assume they would also 
have exerted a strong impact on fractionalization and polarization at county level in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Furthermore, if certain population 
Conci,t0
= max(sg,i,t0 )
10 A more detailed discussion of the reasons for the introduction of the fractionalization and polarization 
indices together in the same regression is presented in Section 3 of Supplementary Online Material.
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groups predominantly settled in wealthy regions and if this initial prosperity per-
sisted over time, excluding the initial endowment factors of a county would lead to 
omitted variables and therefore biased estimates.
The second set of control variables in our model, vector X , represents the t − k 
time dimension, which corresponds to 10 years prior to the period considered in the 
dependent variable. Again, we control for factors inﬂuencing the economic develop-
ment of the county, such as population size (as natural log), educational attainment, 
female participation in the labour force, unemployment, the share of black popula-
tion, infant mortality and the share of the labour force employed in agriculture. We 
shift X by 10 years in order to reduce the risk of reverse causality between diversity 
levels and income per capita.
4.5  The Data
For the construction of the dependent variable, we employ income per capita data 
extracted from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) database and the Cur-
rent Population Survey tables (CPS) of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
measured in US dollars. As income per capita was only available for the years 1950 
onwards, we resorted to a proxy for the years 1900–1940 and used either the salary 
income (1940) or calculated an aggregated mean income at county level constructed 
using the median total income per occupation in 1950 dollars (1900–1930). The 
necessary input data for these proxies were extracted from the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series USA database (IPUMS) Version 6.0 (Ruggles et  al. 2015). This 
database provides US microdata covering the censuses and American Community 
Surveys between 1790 and 2010.11 We use the natural log of income as dependent 
variable.
The main independent variables of interest, fractionalization and polarization as 
well as concentration were built using the birthplace data at county level of the years 
1880, 1900 and 1910, extracted from the IPUMS USA database. The birthplaces 
of a weighted population sample of 5,791,531 individuals in 1880, 3,852,852 indi-
viduals in 1900 and 923,153 individuals in 1910 were aggregated and allocated to 
the counties of residence of the individual. As the number and size of US counties 
changed over the period of analysis (2875 counties in 1880, 3090 in 1900 and 3123 
in 1910), we matched counties at the time of migration to their 2010 equivalent 
using US Census Bureau cartographic boundary ﬁles of the 48 continental states for 
each decade included in the analysis.
Data for the control variables were extracted from the IPUMS USA, the US BEA, 
the US BLS, the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 
(ICPSR) database as well as from the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) databases. In cases involving microdata, the data for individuals were 
aggregated at the county level. With the exception of mean income and educational 
attainment, all variables followed the same calculation method based on the same 
11 The American Community Survey was only initiated in 2005.
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available data points across all years in question. The variable expressing the aggre-
gated mean income at county level in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
is constructed similarly to our dependent variable on the basis of the median total 
income per occupation (in 1950 dollars). Educational attainment is proxied by the 
percentage of people completing their college education for the years 1940–2000. 
From 1880 to 1930, we used the literacy rate per county as educational variable. A 
description of all variables is given in Appendix 1.
4.5.1  Instrumental Variable Estimation
Several endogeneity issues may arise when dealing with long-term migration data. 
While diversity may affect local GDP per capita, it is also likely that a higher GDP 
itself attracts more migrants, thereby increasing the level of diversity in the region. 
Consequently, the direction of causality remains ambiguous: GDP per capita on a 
regional level may be a function of diversity just as local diversity may be a con-
sequence of local wealth. Moreover, when working with migration data, non-ran-
dom spatial patterns in the distribution of migrants across space are likely to appear. 
Regional spillovers in migration may therefore generate clusters of counties with 
high levels of diversity. This spatial sorting would lead to endogeneity issues in 
our OLS regressions due to omitted variables. In order to address these endoge-
neity issues, we resort to instrumental variable (IV) estimation methods with the 
aim of revealing the true underlying effect of past diversity levels on income levels 
over time and to ensure the validity of the least squares estimations.12 We employ a 
shift-share methodology following Card (1999), Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Saiz 
(2007). This instrument computes the estimated population composition of a county 
in 1880, 1900 and 1910 based on the population composition in a previous base 
year13 and the US growth rate per population group between base and target years. 
This implies using the share of inhabitants per birthplace within the population of a 
county in the base year and multiplying this share by the growth rate of that particu-
lar group within the US population for the time frame between base year and 1880, 
1900 or 1910. Hence, we extrapolate predicted population shares under the assump-
tion that migrants settle in areas where their predecessors had already established 
themselves. With these calculated predicted population shares, we then estimate an 
imputed fractionalization, polarization and concentration index for each county in 
the respective target year.
The use of the shift-share instrument is based on the assumption that highly 
diverse counties in the earlier years of the big migration waves developed a diversity 
buzz which became a pull factor for new migrants. With the use of the shift-share 
instrument, we assume these highly diverse counties to have remained attractive to 
incoming migrants in the following decades, implying also that any changes in the 
12 An extensive discussion of the spatial nature of the data and of the potential existence of spatial 
dependency is developed in Section 4 of Supplementary Online Material.
13 Diversity levels in 1880 are instrumented by the population composition in 1870. For 1900 and 1910 
values, we used 1880 base values due to the significantly larger data sample available.
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degree of diversity at county level would have been independent of county-speciﬁc 
shocks that may have taken place within the time frame in question.
The results of the Staiger and Stock (1997) test for weak instruments using the 
ﬁrst-stage F-statistic of joint signiﬁcance conﬁrm that the shift-share variables for 
fractionalization, polarization and concentration are all strong instruments. The 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics in combination with the Stock and Yogo (2005) 
critical values for tests of weak instruments further support the validity of the instru-
ments. The instruments reject the null of weak identiﬁcation when testing at a nomi-
nal 5% signiﬁcance level. Both the imputed polarization and fractionalization indi-
ces as well as the shift-share instrument for concentration are identiﬁed as strong 
across the three base years and the various time shifts of the dependent variable.
5  Analysis
5.1  The Long Term
The analysis starts with an evaluation of the long-term impact of diversity. Our ﬁrst 
research question—whether population diversity levels generated in 1880, 1900 
and 1910 are connected to county-level income per capita 100–130 years later—is 
ﬁrst assessed by means of an ordinary least squares regression. As mentioned in 
the empirical approach, the model controls for wealth-inﬂuencing factors both at the 
time of migration and in recent years and includes state controls in order to control 
for state-speciﬁc unobserved factors inﬂuencing the counties’ prosperity (von Ber-
lepsch et al. 2018). Table 2 reports the results of Model 1 for our two main variables 
of interest, fractionalization and polarization, for 1880, 1900 and 1910 with respect 
to income per capita levels in 2010.
The results in Table  2 unveil a positive long-term connection of country-level 
population diversity with current GDP per capita. The fractionalization index dis-
plays positive coeﬃcients with signiﬁcance levels below 1% across all three base 
years. The presence of large numbers of diﬀerent groups according to place of 
origin in one county during the age of mass migration is strongly associated with 
higher levels of income in that county 100–130 years later. Polarization, by contrast, 
remains insigniﬁcant across all three base years. Hence, polarization at the height of 
the big migration waves seems detached from current levels of county wealth.
The signs and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients of the control variables reinforce 
the validity of the model, as they are in line with traditional studies on the deter-
minants of growth. A good educational endowment in 2000 is connected to higher 
levels of income per capita in 2010. Conversely, levels of unemployment and the 
percentage of black population—a proxy for poverty—in 2000 are linked to lower 
county wealth.
Of the factors that may have aﬀected decisions to migrate more than a century 
ago, few are still connected to county levels of development in recent years. The 
one exception is the share of black population in 1880, 1900 and 1910. In all cases, 
counties with a higher percentage of black people at the turn of the century have sig-
niﬁcantly higher levels of income per head today. The total population of a county in 
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Table 2  Long-term impact of diversity—OLS 1880, 1900 and 1910
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
a Variables date from respective year of migration 1880, 1900 or 1910
Dep. variable: income p.c. 2010 (ln) 1880 OLS 1900 OLS 1910 OLS
Fractionalizationa 0.144*** 0.176*** 0.155***
(0.0501) (0.0474) (0.0323)
Polarizationa − 0.0365 − 0.0470 − 0.0301
(0.0411) (0.0376) (0.0308)
Education 2000 0.0125*** 0.0125*** 0.0123***
(0.000782) (0.000826) (0.000822)
Total population 2000 (ln) 0.00145 0.00296 − 0.00257
(0.00566) (0.00560) (0.00562)
Share of black population 2000 − 0.00133*** − 0.000912* − 0.00141***
(0.000462) (0.000489) (0.000493)
Female participation 2000 − 0.000141 0.000245 0.000563
(0.00117) (0.00110) (0.00107)
Unemployment 2000 − 0.0247*** − 0.0264*** − 0.0246***
(0.00461) (0.00421) (0.00452)
Infant mortality 2000 − 8.41e−05 − 0.000161 − 0.000126
(0.000322) (0.000288) (0.000286)
Agriculture 2000 − 0.000330 − 0.000405 − 0.000333
(0.00208) (0.00224) (0.00226)
Mean income (ln)a − 0.000603 − 0.000442 − 0.00535*
(0.00333) (0.00407) (0.00285)
Literacya 0.0976** 0.0368 0.0679
(0.0395) (0.0850) (0.0499)
Total population (ln)a − 0.0120** − 0.0125 − 0.00806
(0.00498) (0.00761) (0.00834)
Share of black  populationa 0.219*** 0.173*** 0.209***
(0.0459) (0.0375) (0.0435)
Female  participationa 0.0319 − 0.0287 0.000231
(0.0895) (0.0910) (0.0513)
Unemploymenta − 0.00865 − 0.0468** − 0.207
(0.00959) (0.0189) (0.161)
Agriculturea − 0.0687 0.000508 − 0.0963***
(0.0531) (0.0675) (0.0204)
State controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2825 3024 3094
R2 0.642 0.637 0.642
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1880, the level of unemployment in 1900, the proportion of agricultural employment 
in 1910 and the mean income in 1910 are negatively associated with income per 
head in 2010, while literacy in 1880 displays a positive and significant sign. Popula-
tion diversity—measured as fractionalization—hence proves to have a considerably 
Table 3  Long-term impact of concentration—OLS 1880, 1900 and 1910
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
a Variables date from respective year of migration 1880, 1900 or 1910
Dep. variable: income p.c. 2010 (ln) 1880 OLS 1900 OLS 1910 OLS
Concentration a − 0.158*** − 0.175*** − 0.149***
(0.0486) (0.0467) (0.0329)
Education 2000 0.0125*** 0.0125*** 0.0123***
(0.000777) (0.000831) (0.000822)
Total population 2000 (ln) 0.00196 0.00284 − 0.00251
(0.00572) (0.00569) (0.00576)
Share of black population 2000 − 0.00133*** − 0.000857* − 0.00141***
(0.000458) (0.000492) (0.000496)
Female participation 2000 − 0.000129 0.000223 0.000535
(0.00115) (0.00110) (0.00108)
Unemployment 2000 − 0.0249*** − 0.0268*** − 0.0247***
(0.00476) (0.00428) (0.00462)
Infant mortality 2000 − 4.60e−05 − 0.000160 − 0.000127
(0.000320) (0.000293) (0.000290)
Agriculture 2000 − 0.000157 − 0.000259 − 0.000287
(0.00207) (0.00227) (0.00223)
Mean income (ln)a − 0.00108 − 0.000371 − 0.00504*
(0.00342) (0.00408) (0.00289)
Literacya 0.104** 0.0522 0.0754
(0.0393) (0.0926) (0.0531)
Total population (ln)a − 0.0116** − 0.0111 − 0.00585
(0.00470) (0.00758) (0.00816)
Share of black  populationa 0.224*** 0.172*** 0.208***
(0.0441) (0.0389) (0.0427)
Female  participationa 0.0339 − 0.0308 − 0.00295
(0.0927) (0.0888) (0.0514)
Unemploymenta − 0.00965 − 0.0463** − 0.207
(0.00924) (0.0193) (0.167)
Agriculturea − 0.0743 − 0.00275 − 0.0974***
(0.0525) (0.0614) (0.0199)
State controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2826 3024 3094
R2 0.643 0.636 0.641
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stronger association with future income levels than the large majority of other base 
year controls. Put differently, the results suggest that a highly diverse population is 
a better indicator of future regional wealth than, in particular, county wealth at the 
time of migration.
The results prove to be robust to the replacement of the diversity variables by a 
measure of group concentration, as indicated in Model 2 (Table 3). The concentra-
tion index is signiﬁcant at the 1% level—as was the case of the fractionalization 
index in Table  2—although the association with income per capita in 2010 is, as 
expected, negative. Hence, US counties with a more homogeneous population com-
position (dominated by one large group, regardless of whether the group originates 
from abroad or from a diﬀerent American state) more than a century ago seem to 
have endured a substantially worse economic trajectory over the last 100–130 years 
than those which attracted a large number of people stemming from diﬀerent birth-
places. The largely homogenous population composition has hampered the emer-
gence of innovation boosting conditions linked to the buzz of diversity.
As far as both sets of control variables are concerned, there is nearly no change 
in either the signiﬁcance levels or in the signs of the coeﬃcients compared to those 
reported in Table 2.
In order to address potential endogeneity issues due to the risk of omitted vari-
able bias as a result of spatial sorting, reverse causality or unaccounted economic 
shocks, an instrumental variable estimation is performed using the aforementioned 
shift-share methodology for all three main variables of interest: fractionalization, 
polarization (Table 4, columns 1, 2 and 3) and concentration (Table 4, columns 4, 5 
and 6).
Table 4 reports a positive and strongly signiﬁcant impact of high levels of frac-
tionalization in all three base years on income per capita levels in 2010 supporting 
the validity of previous results. In contrast to the OLS regressions, the polarization 
index, while remaining negative, becomes signiﬁcant at the 5% level for 1880 and 
the 10% for 1900 and 1910, respectively. This proves that once we control for endo-
geneity issues and correct potentially biased estimators, diversity reveals its true 
underlying two-dimensional long-term impact on income per capita levels. On the 
one hand, the presence of a large number of groups and, thus, considerable popula-
tion diversity (high fractionalization) is an important factor behind the long-term 
economic dynamism of places in the US, provided the diverse groups are not too 
polarized and, therefore, able to communicate with one another (low polarization). 
By contrast, highly homogeneous societies have experienced much lower economic 
dynamism over the long term (Table 4, regressions 4, 5 and 6). The signs and level 
of signiﬁcance of the control variables remain virtually unchanged from those 
reported in Tables 2 and 3.
5.2  The Dynamic Impact of Diversity
The second part of the analysis is dedicated to examining the dynamic impact of 
diversity on income levels. Starting with income levels in 1900, the dependent vari-
able in Model 1 is changed each time by 10 years in order to account for potential 
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changes in the inﬂuence of original population diversity on income per head. For 
this part of the analysis, however, vector Z , including the base year controls, is 
dropped from the estimation in order to avoid issues of multicollinearity in the ear-
lier years considered. By means of an ordinary least squares regression, followed 
again by two rounds of robustness checks, we seek to analyse whether the impact of 
diversity on county-level income per head varies over time. The results of the analy-
sis are reported in Table 5.
The results point towards an enduring and positive association between popula-
tion diversity and local income levels in the US. With the exception of the 1920s 
to 1940s, heavily affected by the great depression and both world wars, the link 
between fractionalization and income per capita at the county level remains posi-
tive and strong, with no evidence of a waning or shifting connection over time. As 
in Table 2, with the exception of 1 year in the 1900 base year regression, there is no 
significant connection between population polarization and income levels.
To test the validity of these results, we conduct the same exercise substituting 
fractionalization and polarization by concentration levels within the county popula-
tion (Table 5). In line with the previous long-term results (Table 3), a strong nega-
tive association between high levels of concentration and regional income levels 
emerges not only in the long term, but also in the short and medium term. Similarly, 
the effect of concentration is negative and significant over the whole 100-year time 
frame considered, with the exception of 1920–1940.
Both OLS regressions emphasize the importance of a county’s population com-
position at the time of the great migration waves to the US for its subsequent eco-
nomic development. The results suggest that counties which failed to attract a large 
variety of groups from different origins—both international and national—seem to 
have suffered negative economic consequences for more than a century, as indicated 
by the significantly lower income levels, than those counties that succeeded in estab-
lishing vibrant and diverse communities.
Is this dynamic connection purely an association or is there a causal relationship? 
To answer this question, we resort to the use of an instrumental variable estimation, 
using, once again, a shift-share instrument. The results for both Models 1 and 2 are 
displayed in Table 6.
Again, and with the exception of the period between 1920 and 1940, the results 
depict a strong and robust association across time between population diversity and 
regional income levels. As in the OLS estimations, the coefficient for the fraction-
alization index remains, across all three base years, positive and highly significant at 
the 1% level. In contrast to the OLS regressions, the use of an IV estimation makes 
the coeﬃcient of polarization signiﬁcant for the early (1900–1910) and later years 
(1960–2000) of the analysis. Polarization has, as expected, a negative inﬂuence on 
county-level economic development in line with Alesina et al. (2003), Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2005a,b), or Ager and Brückner (2013a). Wherever strong barriers 
across place-of-birth origins were evident among population groups at the time of 
the great migration, local development has lagged behind.
Moreover, we now ﬁnd a dynamic eﬀect related to the size of the coeﬃcients. 
This is particularly evident in the case of the 1880 and 1900 base year regressions. 
Columns 1 and 2 (income in 1900 and 1910 as dependent variables) in Table  6 
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display coeﬃcients up to 6 times larger than those presented in columns 10 or 11 
(1990 and 2000). The results indicate that high levels of fractionalization and polari-
zation in the composition of a population had a more powerful eﬀect on income lev-
els within the ﬁrst 10–30 years, while, in the longer term, despite remaining signiﬁ-
cant, the extent of this eﬀect becomes signiﬁcantly smaller (Fig. 5). Hence, a high 
degree of population diversity, generated by mass internal and international migra-
tion at the turn of the twentieth century, is at the origin of some sort of diversity 
buzz. Such local buzz produced fertile grounds for long-term increases in productiv-
ity and innovation (Jacobs 1961, 1969). But the impact of population diversity has 
not been constant over time. The inﬂuence of diversity on county-level wealth was 
particularly strong during the years when migrants were still economically active 
and kept the local population culturally diverse. As long as the diﬀerent population 
groups remained clearly distinct from one another and immersed in the culture of 
their home countries and home regions, the economic impact of diversity remained 
high. The assimilation of migrants and, especially, of their children into the Ameri-
can melting pot reduced population diversity and, consequently, attenuated its posi-
tive economic eﬀects. As the cultural distance between previously highly diﬀerent 
population groups decreased with adaptation to the American way of life, the eco-
nomic premium linked to past local diversity waned. However, the positive eﬀect of 
past diversity buzz did not disappear completely: formerly diverse counties remained 
more dynamic over time than counties that had, by and large, stayed mostly homo-
geneous in their population composition. Hence, diversity shocks at local level seem 
to have triggered economic mechanisms that became engraved in the territory and 
have proven enduring—leaving traces that can still be detected more than a cen-
tury after the initial shock took place. In spite of the assimilation of former migrants 
into American culture, the rapid “Americanization” of their children, and the loss 
of local diversity over successive generations, high historical population diversity 
levels in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century still aﬀect current local 
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economic development across the US. Diversity linked to migration has left a very 
long-lasting trace on local wealth, which is still measurable in terms of higher aver-
age income levels today.
Replacing fractionalization and polarization with concentration yields results 
which are almost the reverse carbon copy of the fractionalization coeﬃcients. Con-
centration proves yet again to have a negative, enduring, and strongly robust impact 
on local economic development. Just like the indexes of fractionalization and polari-
zation, high levels of concentration within a county’s population reveal a dynamic 
impact on income levels over time. The large coeﬃcients in the short term decrease 
over time, despite keeping strong signiﬁcance levels throughout.
The above ﬁndings reinforce and extend the ﬁndings of Hong and Page (2001), 
Florida (2002), and Niebuhr (2010) that more diverse places, measured by the num-
ber of population groups, are more innovative and productive than more homogene-
ous places. Diversity fosters economic growth—not only in the short term, but also 
in the medium term and even in the very long term. However, channels for dialogue 
between the diﬀerent groups need to be established, as the relative size and distance 
between groups of diﬀerent origins interacting in a territory prove to be detrimental 
for sustainable economic development. If the lines separating groups are too deep 
and insuperable, communication lines fail, bridging between groups becomes dif-
ﬁcult, resulting in social unrest and conﬂict, highly polarized societies, and thus low 
economic growth.
6  Conclusion
The question of whether and how population diversity impacts the economic trajec-
tory of territories has recently attracted increasing attention (i.e. Easterly and Levine 
1997; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Ottaviano and Peri 2006; Gören 2014; Alesina 
et al. 2016; Bove and Elia 2017). The literature dealing with the topic has focused 
on a multitude of factors, ranging from the labour force set-up and skill endowments 
to the provision of public goods. Two opposing views have emerged—one refer-
ring to diversity as growth-enhancing, the other as growth-reducing. Each view is 
to some extent dependent on the respective diversity indicator employed. The most 
frequently used are population fractionalization and measures of polarization and 
segregation.
Most analyses have, however, typically considered the short-term economic 
impact of diversity rather than evaluating its eﬀects over longer time frames. 
Despite an undeniable eﬀect on growth over the short term, whether past popu-
lation diversity levels still aﬀect economic outcomes over the medium or long 
term and whether there is a time-varying impact on regional economic prosper-
ity remains an almost untouched area within the scientiﬁc literature. This paper 
has aimed to ﬁll in the gap. The objective has been to assess the extent to which 
diversity, measured as two-dimensional notion of fractionalization and polari-
zation, in the population composition of US counties during the Age of Mass 
Migration between 1880 and 1910 has left an imprint on the region’s economic 
development and whether that potential imprint can still be felt today, more than a 
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century later. It also evaluates whether the dimension and the direction of the 
impact of diversity on economic development trends over time, by considering 
the impact of diversity over a period of 130 years, shifting the focus of the analy-
sis 10 years at a time between 1900 and 2000.
The results of the analysis identify the presence of a strong and very long-
lasting impact of diversity on county-level economic development. Counties that 
attracted migrants from very diverse national and international origins over a cen-
tury ago are signiﬁcantly richer today than those that were marked by a more 
homogeneous population at the time. Highly diverse counties after the big migra-
tion waves of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries strongly beneﬁted 
from the enlarged skill set, the different perspectives and experiences the arriv-
ing migrants brought with them and from the interaction among those differ-
ent groups. The result was the surge of new ideas and of a newfound dynamism 
which quickly became translated into lofty short-term economic gains. These 
gains proved durable and, albeit in a reduced way, can still be felt today.
Yet, the beneﬁts of diversity came with a strong caveat: the gains of having a 
large number of groups from different origins within a territory (fractionaliza-
tion) only materialize if the diverse groups are able to communicate with one 
another (low polarization). Deep cut lines separating the groups (high polariza-
tion) emerge as an important barrier for economic development. Hence, diversity 
becomes a double-edged sword: it works only if the different groups can interact, 
that is, if the “melting pot” really happens. Where it is not possible to build a 
dialogue between the different groups, where bridging does not occur, groups and 
communities remain in their own physical or mental ghettoes, undermining any 
economic beneﬁts from a diverse environment.
In the US context, the beneﬁts from diversity have remained over time. Where 
high levels of diversity were coupled with “bridging” across groups—high popu-
lation fractionalization with low polarization—economic gains arose that were 
felt in the short, medium and long term. With the exception of the highly tur-
bulent 1920s to 1940s, a strongly positive and robust association between frac-
tionalization and regional income levels, as well as a negative association of 
polarization, is in evidence in the analysis. The only change in this enduring rela-
tionship is that both connections, while remaining strongly statistically signiﬁ-
cant, become weaker after the 1920s. While the initial spark of diversity at the 
turn of the twentieth century was a strong booster of economic dynamism for a 
period of between 10 and 30 years, its impact, albeit decreasing, has not yet faded 
entirely. A strong diversity residue remains.
We can only speculate about the reasons of why this is the case. As succes-
sive generations of migrants have blended into the American “melting pot” and 
often moved away from where their ancestors settled, the seeds of diversity may 
have grown roots not only in local institutions, but also in places. Diversity, in 
those places where it facilitated the bridging among groups more than a century 
ago, has in all likelihood generated more welcoming, vibrant, entrepreneurial and 
innovative territories. This vibrancy has, in a way, become embedded in the very 
core of the territory, a factor which guarantees that transformations which took 
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place a very long time ago are still felt today. However, further case-study based, 
anthropological research will be needed in order to firmly prove this point.
The results of the analysis also have implications for policy. Even though the con-
ditions and circumstances today do not correspond to those in the USA in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, our results appeal for pause and thought in 
a period when migration policies are fast changing and have often become driven 
by anti-system and populist parties and the tabloid press. At a time when many 
developed countries are rapidly closing down their borders to immigration, trying 
to shield what—particularly in the case of Europe and Japan—are still rather homo-
geneous populations from external inﬂuences and the perceived security, economic 
and welfare threats often unjustly associated with migrants, restricting migration 
will limit diversity and is bound to have important and long-lasting economic con-
sequences. By foregoing new migration, wealthy societies may be jeopardizing, as 
our research shows, not only the short-term positive impact associated with greater 
diversity, but also the enduring positive inﬂuence of diversity on economic develop-
ment. The large, positive and persistent impact of societal diversity on economic 
development seen in the United States would therefore be diﬃcult to replicate—
something that ageing and lethargic societies across the developed world cannot 
relinquish. However, if migration is to be encouraged, it is of utmost importance 
that mechanisms facilitating the dialogue across groups and hence the integration of 
migrants are in place to guarantee that diversity is transformed into higher and dura-
ble economic activity over the short, medium and long term.
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Appendix 1: Variable descriptions
Variable Description Source
Income (ln) Natural log of income levels of county i in 
year t
 1950–2010: income per capita in current 
dollars—not adjusted for inﬂation
US BEA, US BLS
 1940: family wage and salary income in 
current dollars—not adjusted for inﬂation
IPUMS USA
 1900–1930: aggregated mean income 
constructed on the basis of median total 
income per occupation in hundreds of 
1950 dollars
IPUMS USA
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Variable Description Source
Fractionalization Level of fractionalization in county i in 
year t0
IPUMS USA
Own construction
Polarization Level of polarization in county i in year t0 IPUMS USA
Own construction
Concentration Level of concentration in county i in year t0 IPUMS USA
Own construction
Shiftshare_diversitya Fractionalization index-based shiftshare in 
year t0
IPUMS USA
Own construction
Shiftshare_polarizationa Polarization index-based shiftshare in year t0 IPUMS USA
Own construction
Shiftshare_concentrationa Concentration index-based shiftshare in 
year t0
IPUMS USA
Own construction
Education 1940–2000: percentage of population of 
county i with college degree
ICPSR
Literacy 1880–1930: literacy rate in county i IPUMS USA
Total population (ln) Natural log of total population in county i ICPSR
Share of black population Percentage of black population of county i ICPSR and IPUMS USA
Female participation Female participation rate in the labour force 
in county i
ICPSR and IPUMS USA
Unemployment Unemployment rate in county i ICPSR, US BEA and US BLS
Infant mortality Infant mortality rate in county i CDC and ICPSR
Agriculture Percentage of the labour force employed in 
agriculture in county i
ICPSR, US BEA and US BLS
Mean income (ln) Natural log of mean income of population in 
county i in 1880, 1900 and 1910
ICPSR and IPUMS USA
State controls State dummies Own construction
a Base years: 1870 for 1880 and 1880 for subsequent years
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